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an equal chance to defend his property interest. The deterrent effect
on those creditors who in the past initiated unjust claims may also be
of substantial value to the buyer's interest.
PETER CHATILOVICZ
GIDEON'S ENCORE
Petitioner, an indigent, was tried without benefit of represen-
tation by counsel on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon. The
offense was punishable by imprisonment for up to six months and/or
a one thousand dollar fine. The petitioner was sentenced to serve
ninety days. He thereafter filed an original writ of habeas corpus in
the Supreme Court of Florida alleging that, as an indigent, he was
deprived of his right to counsel and that he was therefore unable to
properly raise and present to the trial court good and sufficient de-
fenses to the charges for which he was convicted. The Florida court
discharged the writ, holding that indigent defendants were entitled
to counsel only when the offense involved a possible imprisonment of
more than six months.1 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
held, reversed: Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may
be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misde-
meanor, or felony, unless represented by counsel at trial. Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972).
The right to counsel has slowly but steadily evolved for forty
years2 and was extended to state felony defendants in the landmark
case of Gideon v. Wainwright.' The sweeping language of Gideon' met
mixed reactions in the state courts and legislatures. In a large minority
of them the case was limited on its facts to felonies.' However,
thirty-one states extended the Gideon rule to crimes less serious than
1. State ex ret. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1970).
2. See, e.g., Comment, Will the Trumpet of Gideon Be Heard in All the Halls of Jus-
tice?, 25 U. MiAmi L. REV. 450, 451-52 (1971); Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded
Right to Counsel, 55 IOWA L. Rlv. 1249, 1250 (1970).
3. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Gideon]. An interesting account of the
preparation of a series of right to counsel cases including Gideon is found in A. LEWIS,
GIDEON'S TRuMPET (1964); and J. MEADOR, PRELUDES TO GIDEON (1967).
4. The Court stated:
[A]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured
a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him .... The right of one charged with
crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental . . . in some countries, but it is
in ours.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). The applicable language of the sixth amend-
ment is equally broad, providing that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. E.g., State ex rel. Taylor v. Warden, 193 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1967); Watkins v. Morris,
179 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1965); Fish v. State, 159 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1964).
CASES NOTED
felonies.' Just prior to Argersinger, the jurisdictions providing coun-
sel to indigents, either by statute or decision, fell into roughly four
categories.7 Twelve states adopted a "serious offense" standard.8 Others
established a six month incarceration rule, generally adopting the
reasoning of Duncan v. LouisianaY A third view, the ninety day rule,
found a very active proponent in the federal Fifth Circuit.'0 The final
approach was the "any incarceration rule.""
The Supreme Court added to the confusion surrounding the ex-
tent of the Gideon holding by denying certiorari in a series of cases
presenting the question of right to counsel in misdemeanor trials. 2
However, the historic evolution of the indigent's right to counsel 3
made a further extension probable. When the Court granted certiorari
in Argersinger4 the only question remaining was which view would the
court adopt?
Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court, indicating
several due process bases for the extension of the right to counsel to
all indigents facing imprisonment. Pointing out that there is no his-
torical basis for limiting the right to counsel as there is for the right
to trial by jury,'5 he stressed that serious legal and constitutional prob-
lems present in even "petty offense" prosecutions which lead to impris-
onment,' often make the- assistance of counsel a requisite to the
existence of a fair trial. The problem of uninformed guilty pleas,17 the
6. The states' positions are compiled in Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of
Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. Rxv. 103 (1970).
7. Comment, The Right of the Indigent Misdemeanant to Appointed Counsel, 16 S.
DAKOTA L. RZv. 400 (1971) [hereinafter cited as "The Right of the Indigent Misdemeanant"].
8. E.g., State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784 (1964). See Comment, Right to
Counsel: The Impact oj Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REv.
103, 119-24 (1970).
9. E.g., State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So.2d 442, 443 (Fla. 1970), citing
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
10. The Right of the Indigent Misdemeanant, supra note 7, at 402-05; see Comment,
Will the Trumpet of Gideon Be Heard in All the Halls of Justice?, 25 U. MOiU L. Rv.
450, 458-61 (1971).
11. The Right of the Indigent Misdemeanant, supra note 7, at 405-06; e.g., State v.
Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967). See also State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin,
236 So.2d 442, 444-46 (Fla. 1970) (Boyd, J., joined by Ervin, C.J., and Adkins, J., dis-
senting in part).
12. The cases are compiled in Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v.
Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REv. 103, 110 n.44 (1970).
13. See, e.g., Comment, Will the Trumpet of Gideon Be Heard in All the Halls of Jus-
tice?, 25 U. Mixis L. REv. 450, 451-52 (1971); Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded
Right to Counsel, 55 IowA L. Rzv. 1249, 1250 (1970). The landmark cases are Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst,
309 U.S. 458 (1938); and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 401 U.S. 908 (1971).
15. 92 S. Ct. at 2009, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 and 64-5 (1932).
16. 92 S. Ct. at 2010; e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 92 S. Ct. 839 (1972)
(vagrancy); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (public drunkenness); Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965) (loitering); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362
U.S. 199 (1960) (loitering, disorderly conduct).
17. Counsel is needed so that the accused may know precisely what he is doing,
1972]
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high volume of misdemeanor cases which leads to prejudicial "assembly-
line" justice," and the serious repercussions of any imprisonment 0
were instrumental in forcing the conclusion that the indigent facing
imprisonment requires the aid of counsel to obtain a fair trial.
The only objections raised to the Argersinger extension of Gideon
have centered around the practical problems of cost and implemen-
tation. Reflecting this very real apprehension of a heavy new burden
upon the profession and the taxpayers were the concurring opinions."0
However, Mr. Justice Powell, joined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dis-
agreed in a concurring opinion with the establishment of any rigid
requirement for right to counsel. While agreeing that the right to
counsel is more fundamental than the right to trial by jury, they pre-
ferred to follow a flexible due process approach which would require
counsel to be appointed whenever "fundamental fairness" so required. 1
They also objected to the imprisonment standard as, inter alia, creat-
ing equal protection problems within a single jurisdiction where a judge
may decide to open or foreclose the possibility of imprisonment in ad-
vance of trial. 22 The Court's approach, while the most far-reaching
of those previously mentioned, should prove to be the easiest to admin-
ister, avoiding the problems of calculating maximum sentences 23 and
the series of "special circumstances" exceptions, inherent in Mr. Justice
Powell's approach, which led to the demise of Betts v. Brady.4
The actual fiscal impact of Argersinger is unclear due to a lack of
so that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or prison, and so that he
is treated fairly by the prosecution.
92 S. Ct. at 2011.
18. While accurate statistics are unavailable, there are four to five million misdemeanor
and perhaps 50 million traffic violation cases annually. Note, Dollars and Sense of an
Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 IOWA L., REv. 1249, 1260-61 (1970). There are over 1,100
non-felony cases per week in the Municipal Court of Jacksonville, Florida, which has less
than 600 active members in its bar. McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106, 109 n.3 (1965).
19. 92 S. Ct. at 2012, quoting from Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970). In
Marston v. Oliver, 324 F. Supp. 691, 696 (E.D. Va. 1971), the court stated: "Any in-
carceration of over thirty days . . . will usually result in loss of employment, with a
consequent substantial detriment to the defendant and his family."
20. The Chief Justice observed that "the dynamics of the profession have a way of
rising to the burdens placed on it." 92 S. Ct. at 2015. Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr.
Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart, suggests that "law students can be looked to to
make a significant contribution, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the representation of the
poor. . . ." Id. at 2016. Unfortunately, the number of communities with law schools and the
number of students interested are limited. Id. at 2022 n.21 (Mr. Justice Powell concurring
in the result).
21. The necessity of counsel to assure a fair trial would be determined by examining
the complexity of the charged offense, the severity of the probable sentence, and indi-
vidual factors such as the defendant's competency. Id. at 2026 (Mr. Justice Powell con-
curring in the result).
22. Id. at 2021.
23. See Shepard v. Jordan, 425 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1970); Matthews v. Florida, 422
F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1970).
24. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
The exceptions are compiled in Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v.
Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIOHTON L. REV. 103, 104 n.ll (1970).
CASES NOTED
accurate statistics. Assuming that there are 1.25 million indigent mis-
demeanants (not just those facing imprisonment) annually, one study
places the costs at between $62.5 million (assigned counsel at $50 per
case) and $46 million (public defenders at $20,000 per defender) per
year.25 Another study indicates that the additional annual public cost
of providing adequate legal defense for all criminal offenders could be
as high as $180 million annually.2" Allowing for inflation from the
date of these studies, but eliminating indigents not facing imprison-
ment, the costs of Argersinger may exceed $100 million annually, in-
dicating a need for federal funding.2" The distribution and qualifications
of counsel willing to defend indigent misdemeanants at low compen-
sation will similarly create difficulties in implementing Argersinger.8
The burden will obviously be heaviest on the 19 states, including
Florida, not currently providing counsel to misdemeanants.
Argersinger may exacerbate another problem facing the indigent
defendant and the legal profession-inadequate compensation 9 of as-
signed counsel who bear the burden of indigent defense in twenty-nine
hundred counties in the United States. 0 Court appointment with no
compensation, or inadequate compensation, may constitute involuntary
servitude and deprive the attorney of property without due process
and equal protection of the law.31 Such arguments, however, have met
with little success, because courts often find a duty of gratuitous service
as a condition of the license to practice, or as a correlative of the rights
and privileges of the attorney as an officer of the court.82 However, many
commentators argue that the increased burdens of indigent defense
25. Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 IOWA L. REv. 1249,
1263 (1970).
26. Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law, 41 F.R.D.
389, 416 (1966). The estimated expenditure for indigent defense in 1966 was $20 million.
Id.
27. Id.
28. The plight of Wood, South Dakota, in a recent case is described in 92 S. Ct. at
2024.
29. Adequate compensation has been suggested to be "... 60% of the fee a client of
ordinary means would pay an attorney of modest financial success." State v. Rush, 46
N.J. 399, 413, 217 A.2d 441, 448 (1966). An attorney's overhead may run as much as
twenty dollars per working hour, so that even the relatively liberal thirty dollars per
in-court hour of the federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964, which establishes a maximum
of $400 compensation for misdemeanor cases, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1970), may make
indigent defense a losing proposition for most attorneys. Williams and Bost, The Assigned
Counsel System: An Exercise of Servitude?, 42 Miss. L.J. 32, 36 (1971).
30. L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE
COURTS 15 (1965).
31. These were the unsuccessful arguments in State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d
441 (1966). See generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 819 (1968).
32. Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 819, 825-28 (1968). But see Schware v. Board of Bar Exam'rs,
353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957), where the Court wrote: "[Any qualification [for admission to
the bar] must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice
law."
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nullify this duty."8 While the suggestion of an attorney's constitu-
tional right to compensation for assigned defense has met strong resis-
tance, there is evidence that defendants with uncompensated counsel
receive less effective protection of their rights. Occasionally they are
represented in form only. 4 The equal protection path may well be
followed to further protect the indigent by insuring properly com-
pensated appointed counsel.8 5
The Supreme Court of Florida has, in Gideon and now in Arger-
singer, twice been reversed by the United States Supreme Court in
landmark right-to-counsel cases. The two courts often seem to con-
sider the same factors and use the same language, but reach opposite
conclusions.8 6 Yet perhaps the bulk of responsibility for Florida's lag
in this area lies upon the legislature. 7 In contrast, the majority of
states had followed the requirements of Gideon and Argersinger before
those decisions.88 The time interval between major right to counsel
cases has clearly been sufficient to allow gradual statutory extension
by the other states, eliminating the haste, confusion, and sudden mas-
sive expenditures involved in complying with the decisions.8 9
Few affluent laymen would undertake the trial of a just cause,
civil or criminal, without the aid of counsel; and few attorneys can
disagree with Mr. Justice Black's observation that: "The right of one
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and
essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours."4 This sug-
gests that the imprisonment standard of Argersinger is inadequate, as
there are often serious repercussions from any conviction, not just those
33. Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not Meet the Constitutional Mandate,
49 A.B.A.J. 435 (1963); Hunter, Slave Labor in the Courts-A Suggested Solution, 74
CASE & Com. No. 4 at 3 (1969); Note, Indigent Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Right
to Compensated Counsel, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 433 (1967); Williams and Bost, The Assigned
Counsel System: An Exercise of Servitude?, 42 Miss. L.J. 32 (1971).
34. Note, Indigent Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Right to Compensated Counsel,
52 CORNELL L.Q. 433, 439 (1967). Appellate relief is available for incompetency or inade-
quacy of counsel only in extreme cases. See Note, Effectiveness of Appointed Counsel, 29
OHIO ST. L.J. 512 (1968); Comment, Incompetency and Inadequacy of Counsel as a Basis
for Relief in Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 20 Sw. L.J. 136 (1966).
35. Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217
A.2d 441 (1966). For the related problem of indigents' right to appointed experts, see
Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 1256 (1970).
36. Compare, e.g., McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961), with McNeal v. Culver,
113 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1959).
37. In Fish v. State, 159 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1964), the court stated:
By limiting the scope of the [public defender] Act to felonies, the Legislature has,
in effect, declared the public policy of this state to be that persons accused of
misdemeanors only do not necessarily require the appointment of counsel to assist
in their defense.
Id. at 868, referring to what is now FLA. STAT. § 27.50 (1971).
38. Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty
States, 3 CREiGHTON L. Rxv. 103, 133 (1970).
39. See note 2 supra.
40. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (emphasis added).
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resulting in imprisonment; 4' nor is there such distinction drawn in the
sixth amendment.
In the writer's opinion, Argersinger is only another way station on
the path of eventual extension of the right to counsel to cover many
civil" and all criminal cases, including traffic violations.4" Hopefully,
Florida's Legislature and Supreme Court will, of their own accord,
see the writing on the wall and not again be forced to meet their
responsibilities.
WAYNE E. RIPLEY, JR.
THE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE CLUBS TO DISCRIMINATE
AGAINST BLACK GUESTS DESPITE A
STATE-ISSUED LIQUOR LICENSE
Plaintiff, the black guest of a member of a private club which re-
stricted membership to Caucasians, was refused service of food and
beverage solely because of his race. The complaint, brought in the
federal district court under United States Code, title 42, section 1983
(1970) 1 for injunctive relief, alleged that since the Pennsylvania Liquor
Control Board had issued defendant a private club license, the discrim-
ination was state action, and thus a violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 A three-judge district court, con-
vened at plaintiff's request,3 entered a decree declaring invalid the liquor
license issued to the club.4 On direct appeal to the United States Supreme
41. E.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license revocation). See generally
Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929 (1970).
42. Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 CoLutmr. L. REV. 1322 (1966);
cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) ; Comment, Indigent's Access to Civil Court,
4 COLUm. Hum. RTs. L. REV. 267 (1972); see Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in
Civil Cases, 76 YArx L.J. 545 (1967).
43. Blake v. Municipal Ct., 242 Cal. App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771 (Cal. App. 1966).
There is no constitutional basis for limiting the right to cases involving imprisonment, as
the sixth amendment draws no such distinction. See note 4 supra. Placing "social nuisance"
misdemeanors into a nonpunitive, social response setting might eliminate the need for coun-
sel. Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law, 41 F.R.D. 389,
400 (1966). But see People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 314, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368, 373, 213
N.E.2d 670, 673 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. The three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
4. Irvis v. Scott, 318 F. Supp. 1246 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
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